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A Factor-analytic Study of Deployment Attitudes  
of the Sinai Peacekeeping Force

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Abstract

Studying paratroopers' attitudes towards the constabulary mission, such as that of the Sinai Peacekeeping Force, Segal, et al. (1984) found that negative attitudinal changes across time were those related to evaluation of the constabulary role. However, paratroopers "were as willing to deal with domestic disaster areas, riots and revolutionary violence as to deploy for foreign military engagements". The authors inferred from the former findings that the resulting boredom of a constabulary mission may take a greater toll among "elite" troops who are more oriented toward combat situations. Since the general content areas of Segal, et al.'s instrument were not empirically derived but were instead, arbitrarily categorized, it was believed that a factor analysis of the data in that study could help to elucidate the variables impacting on the attitudinal findings. A Principal Components analysis was performed on a correlation matrix of the attitudinal data. Findings suggest that race appears to be an important determinant of attitude towards specific types of deployment; overall, results suggested that motivation and morale depend, to some degree, on the extent to which a soldier can identify with or attach personal meaning to the mission at hand. Further implications are discussed.

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## Introduction

Although historically, the quality of a military organization may have been judged at least partially by its combat readiness, increasingly the role of the military as peacekeeper (the so-called "constabulary" role) has become of great interest and relevance. Janowitz (1960) defined a constabulary force as one which is "committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations, rather than victory". Subsequently Fabian (1971) and Moskos (1975) warned against the use of the major powers and superpowers as peacekeepers. Moskos affirmed that "soldiers from neutral middle powers are more likely to subscribe to the constabulary ethic than soldiers from major powers". However, although the 1979 Camp David Accords specified that peacekeepers were to be drawn "from nations other than those which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council", a satisfactory multinational agreement could not be reached, and ultimately one battalion from each of the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions were assigned the mission.

Segal, Harris, Rothberg and Marlowe (1984) questioned whether there might be "a basic incompatibility" between the peacekeeper ethic and the use of elite airborne units who are especially oriented, compared to most other troops, to combat and action. In a longitudinal study, they compared the attitudes and behaviors of the two Sinai battalions with two non-Sinai assigned control groups: a company remaining at the division garrison (Fort Bragg) and a company deployed for brief jungle warfare training. The survey instrument used was assembled from various sources, e.g., an instrument developed by Brown and Moskos (1976), items used by Blair and Segal (1978), and Moskos (1975), and others added by research staff. The arbitrarily categorized items measured attitudes in the areas of: (1) Combat orientation, (2) Willingness to deploy, (3) Orientation toward social control func-

tions, (4) Evaluations of the constabulary role, and (5) Diffusion of information. Only the fourth category, Evaluations of the constabulary role, proved to change significantly over time as well as to differ from the control groups. Generally, the Sinai peacekeepers felt that constabulary work is boring, and that it is not appropriate for Airborne units. Additionally, perceptions that peacekeeping would help a soldier's military career decreased only in the Sinai sample.

These authors noted that "In general, change in the control groups was in a proconstabulary direction, while change in the Sinai unit was more negative", with the implication that severe morale problems could develop that must be dealt with in a preventive way. A specific area of potential intervention was seemingly uncovered by Segal, et al.'s failure to replicate research by others (e.g., Burrelli and Segal, 1982; Cockerham and Cohen, 1979). Data from these two studies suggested that Marines and paratroopers are more positively oriented to combat missions than to social control functions such as quelling riots or restoring law and order to a disaster area. However, Segal, et al.'s (1984) paratroopers "seemed not to differentiate social control from combat". It was reasoned by the present authors that if the item categories were to be derived empirically, conceivably certain unknown factors could be specified which could serve to support previous data as well as help elucidate the relationships among the attitudinal variables.

#### Method and Results

At the time of the present analysis, the only data available were those obtained from the "first wave", that is, the pre-test scores of the paratroopers prior to their departure for the Sinai. A total of 78 completed questionnaires underwent our analysis. A correlation matrix of all ordinal data was generated (38 of the 49 available items:

basically, all attitudinal Likert-type items; the remainder, not used in the analysis were 'yes-no' type items and demographics). The matrix consisted of Kendall's Tau B coefficients of correlation for all pairwise combinations of these 38 variables. Many of these were found to be statistically significant at or beyond the .05 level, most probably due to sample size. In general, correlations, even significant ones were rather small.

From the correlation matrix, a Principal Components analysis was performed. Using an admittedly arbitrary minimum acceptable factor loading of .50, six factors emerged; of these six, one factor contained 16 heavily loading variables, one factor contained five, one contained three, and the other three factors contained one each. Upon inspection of the data, the six factors were labeled thusly:

Factor I: General orientation towards deployment  
(16 variables).

Factor II: Orientation towards racial intervention  
(three variables).

Factor III: Subjective probability of future  
armed conflict  
(five variables).

Factor IV: Subjective trust of foreigners  
(one variable).

Factor V: Need for personally relevant future  
information  
(one variable).

Factor VI: Subjective sense of passage of time  
(one variable).

Partly due to major time constraints, as well as because of our inference that further study of the first two factors would bear the most fruit, the remainder of our analysis was confined to that of Factors I & II. Listings of the 16 items heavily loading on Factor I, as well as the three included in Factor I which make up Factor II, are presented in Tables 1 & 2 respectively.

In view of the fact that demographic data on the troops had been collected, and that the attitudinal data had suggested a "racial intervention orientation" factor, it was decided to analyze the data by race to determine the extent, if any, of Black-White differences. All 16 of the Factor I variables (General orientation towards deployment) were analyzed, using the Mann-Whitney U statistic. Over 40% of the comparisons of Black vs. White troop attitudes were found to differ from each other to a statistically significant degree (see Table 3). The findings are summarized below (the lower the mean attitude score, the more favorable the attitude towards deployment):

- (1) On invasion of the U.S. by a foreign enemy, white troops showed a significantly higher tendency towards deployment,  $p=.0000$ .
- (2) On invasion of a U.S. ally in Western Europe, white troops showed a significantly higher tendency towards deployment,  $p=.0331$ .
- (3) On rescuing American civilians who are in danger in an overseas country, white troops showed a significantly higher tendency towards deployment,  $p=.0033$ .
- (4) On an overseas war which the American people wholeheartedly support, white troops showed a significantly higher tendency towards deployment,  $p=.007$ .
- (5) On restoring law and order in a disaster area, white troops showed a significantly higher tendency towards deployment,  $p=.0024$ .
- (6) On stopping the violence of whites opposing efforts to integrate public institutions, black troops showed a significantly higher tendency towards deployment,  $p=.045$  (one-tailed).
- (7) On stopping the violence of Blacks threatening private property, white troops showed a significantly higher tendency towards deployment,  $p=.0252$ .
- (8) On attacking a band of revolutionaries, white

troops showed a significantly higher tendency towards deployment,  $p=.0229$ .

An abbreviated correlation matrix of factor-relevant items is presented in Table 4.

### Discussion

Segal, et al. (1984), in assembling their assessment instrument, had, on the basis of previous research, chosen certain items dealing with various hypothetical deployment scenarios, ones which seemed to logically group along the dimension, "foreign vs. domestic deployment situations". Theoretically, it would seem that factors corresponding to the two groups would have emerged. It is thus noteworthy that one factor was found which embodied 16 of both domestic and foreign deployment situations. Although these variables load fairly highly on the factor, inspection of the correlation matrix in Table 4 showed that few, if any of the individual "domestic" variables correlate at all with any of the "foreign" ones. For practicality's sake, we have offered a label, "General orientation towards deployment", with the suggestion that some other causal factor exerts its influence among both "domestic" and "foreign" measures of deployment orientation.

Although two measures of orientation to deployment in racially-oriented situations are included among those loading heavily on the first factor, they, plus one other, taken together, constitute a factor of their own, and it was this outcome, together with the lack of attention paid by Segal, et al. to the demographic data in their analysis, that encouraged us to seek out any potential differences between the races on the various attitudinal measures.

The subsequent analysis resulted in a comparison, between black and white respondents, of

the 17 general deployment orientation variables. A word of caution might be noted: there was a disproportionate number of whites compared to blacks in the sample; while this might have been considered a biasing factor, it may be noted that over half of the comparisons showed no significant differences between races.

In general, within the specific subset of subjects which we were looking at (pre-deployment Sinai subjects), orientation across races towards deployment is generally positive; troops in general are more likely than not to volunteer, or feel positively about the mission when ordered to go. However, as noted above, in approximately 40% of the white-black comparisons, there were racial differences noted in the mean ranked attitude scores. Although there was an overriding tendency to be positively oriented across races, it was revealed that white troops felt significantly more positive towards deployment for the purposes of invasion of the U.S. by a foreign enemy, invasion of a Western European ally, rescuing American civilians in danger overseas, involvement in a war that is popular at home, restoring law and order during a disaster, stopping the violence of blacks threatening private property, and attacking a band of revolutionaries. In one instance, that of stopping the violence of whites opposing efforts to integrate public institutions, blacks showed a significantly more positive orientation towards deployment than did white troops. Equally noteworthy, however, are non-significant differences: blacks and whites showed equal positive orientation towards putting down race conflicts in which blacks and whites are fighting each other, dealing with campus riots and strikes, fighting a war unpopular at home, protecting foreign installations, fighting in a foreign country's civil war, fighting in the Middle East, or in the Far East.

The fact that there do seem to be some

racial differences among deployment motivations and attitudes really suggests that other variables which are highly correlated demographic variables, such as SES, education, time in service, and training may all play a role additively in determining motivation and orientation towards specific types of deployment. Additionally, the fact that blacks and whites seem to differ in motivation in the area of civil disturbances, relative to the racial population involved in the disturbance, suggests that personal (political) philosophy may be central in accounting for motivation in deployment situations. This would imply that to the extent that troops can be made aware of the importance or relevance to themselves of the action to be taken, they will be that much more motivated to involve themselves in it. Without such education or information dispersal, troops are more or less left to their own devices in making inferences about the meaning of or reason for their role; thus groups will differ in motivation, or even lose motivation across groups if little information is available, or if little "sense" can be made of the action by the total deployment force.

Segal, et al. (1984) made reference to the potential importance of preparing troops for what could prove to be a boring time for the more combat-oriented. The obvious implication is that if an "inoculation" procedure of sorts, which would prepare troops for the experience of constabulary duty, could be designed and implemented, it could conceivably have even greater utility if efforts were to be made to emphasize to the troops the long-term effects of their efforts, as they related to each soldier as an American, Black or White person, man or woman, or along whatever specific dimensions are found to be relevant to the issue. Seemingly, the greater the soldier's sense that "there's something in this for me", the greater the motivation to enter on and succeed in the mission. In the interest of designing such an "inoculation"



procedure, further analyses could be done in the way of comparing deployment attitudes relative to such variables as age, marital status, education, and even various, and as yet to be specified, personality variables measurable from standardized assessment instruments. These are surely fertile areas for future research.

Table 1  
16 Items Loading Heavily on Factor I

<u>Item</u>	<u>Factor loading</u>
Invasion of U.S.	0.62246
Invasion of Western European ally	0.67481
Fighting in the Far East	0.73912
Fighting in the Mid East	0.58106
Fighting in a foreign civil war	0.64926
Rescuing endangered Americans overseas	0.63907
Protecting foreign installations	0.69437
Fighting a war popular at home	0.63455
Fighting a war unpopular at home	0.53092
Dealing with riots on campus	0.56550
Restoring law and order during disaster	0.56582
Dealing with strikes	0.56508
Attacking a band of revolutionaries	0.62877
Blacks threatening property	0.57012
Whites opposing forced integration	(0.47532)*
White-Black racial conflicts	0.58235
Protecting public institutions	0.58949

Table 2  
3 Items Loading Heavily on Factor II

Blacks threatening property	0.57878
Whites opposing forced integration	0.51552
White-Black racial conflicts	0.60445

\*Did not meet our criterion; included for purposes of interest only.

Table 3  
Mean Attitude Scores by Race  
on Heavily Factor-loaded Variables  
(lower score=more positive orientation)

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Blacks</u>	<u>Whites</u>
Invasion of U.S.*	1.92	1.22
Invasion of western ally *	1.88	1.62
Fight in the Far East	1.76	1.88
Fight in the Mid East	1.80	1.78
Fight in a foreign civil war	2.04	2.06
Rescue Americans overseas*	1.80	1.31
Protect foreign installations	1.68	1.66
Fight a popular war *	2.04	1.53
Fight an unpopular war	1.88	1.99
Dealing with campus riots	2.16	1.84
Restoring law and order:disaster*	1.80	1.27
Dealing with strikes	2.12	1.87
Attacking revolutionaries *	1.71	1.48
Blacks threatening property *	1.92	1.56
Whites opposing integration **	1.58	1.89
White-Black racial conflict	1.72	1.65
Protecting public institutions	1.92	1.81

\* Significant below the .05 level of significance, two-tailed.

\*\* Significant below the .05 level of significance, one-tailed.

Table 4  
Abbreviated Kendall Tau B Correlation Matrix  
of Factor-relevant Items

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1		.53	.50	.38	.28	.67	.47	.48	.32
2			.80	.59	.55	.50	.62	.62	.49
3				.65	.65	.48	.70	.62	.53
4					.49	.42	.53	.41	.23
5						.42	.53	.60	.57
6							.45	.55	.36
7								.64	.48
8									.57
10	.18	.16	.29	.08	.24	.16	.27	.11	.26
11	.33	.24	.27	.25	.13	.35	.25	.21	.10
12	.14	.14	.26	.16	.17	.24	.30	.09	.25
13	.51	.33	.27	.21	.18	.36	.31	.27	.13
14	.32	.18	.19	.05	.15	.22	.11	.07	.07
15	.11	.13	.16	.00	.21	.12	.15	.08	.12
16	.31	.13	.18	.05	.16	.23	.14	.06	.08
17	.23	.19	.26	.20	.25	.28	.38	.14	.19
10	<u>.10</u>	<u>.11</u>	<u>.12</u>	<u>.13</u>	<u>.14</u>	<u>.15</u>	<u>.16</u>	<u>.17</u>	
11		<u>.46</u>	<u>.60</u>	<u>.44</u>	<u>.54</u>	<u>.46</u>	<u>.57</u>	<u>.49</u>	
12			.45	.47	.42	.26	.36	.38	
13				.37	.51	.41	.53	.37	
14					.63	.40	.61	.41	
15						.71	.75	.50	
16							.68	.34	
17								.48	

Note: correlations of .20 or greater are significant at or beyond the .05 level.

Table 4 (con't)


<u>Variable number</u>	<u>Variable</u>
1	Invasion of U.S.
2	Invasion of western ally
3	Fight in the Far East
4	Fight in the Mid East
5	Foreign civil war
6	Rescue Americans OCONUS
7	Foreign installations
8	Fight a popular war
9	Fight unpopular war
10	Deal with campus riots
11	Deal with a disaster
12	Deal with strikes
13	Attack revolutionaries
14	Blacks threaten property
15	Whites opposing busing
16	White-Black conflict
17	Protect public buildings

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